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MILITARY RETIRED PAY AND DIVORCE: CONGRESS
RETIRES McCARTY v. McCARTY-IS THAT ENOUGH?
The United States Constitution allows the states to exercise broad
powers over domestic relations.' State laws govern the creation and
dissolution of the marriage relationship and numerous rights and obliga-
tions that originate in the relationship between husband and wife.
2 Dif-
ferent patterns of economic, social, and cultural development within in-
dividual states have resulted in a diversity of state laws concerning mar-
riage and divorce.' Separate movements toward reform and uniformity
have succeeded in bringing state marriage and divorce laws closer to the
moral and economic views that prevail within individual states
4 and in
I See U.S. CONST. amend X. The tenth amendment reserves to the states or to the
people all powers that the Constitution does not delegate to the United States nor prohibit
to the states. Id. The Supreme Court often has stated that the subject of domestic relations
is the exclusive province of the states. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220
(1981); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1890); infra note 8 (domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction of federal courts).
In exercising reserved domestic relations powers, the states may act to preserve the in-
stitution of marriage. See Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-
Fault Era, 58 TEx. L. REV. 501, 503-04 (1980). Another state concern in regulating the
grounds for marriage and divorce is the effect given to state court divorce decrees under
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 1 (states must
recognize acts, records, and proceedings of every other state); see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 407-09 (1975) (durational residence requirement for divorce applied to recent state resi-
dent is justified to insulate divorce decree from collateral attack in another state); Viernes
v. District Court, 181 Colo. 284, __, 509 P.2d 306, 308 (1973) (en banc) (establishment of
proper divorce jurisdiction is vital to recognition of decrees under full faith and credit
clause).
2 See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (legislature has always controlled mar-
riage), quoted in Bacchetta v. Bacchetta, __ Pa. , , 445 A.2d 1194, 1197
(1982) (providing for distribution of property upon divorce is within exercise of state's police
power); infra text accompanying notes 17 & 18 (use of state law relationships to resolve
disputes concerning rights in federally created benefits). See generally Developments in
the Law- The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Developments].
See generally Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law
School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033 (1972).
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 101-703 (Purdon Supp. 1982-83) (Pennsylvania Divorce
Code eliminating fault of one party as basis for divorce); Comment, Divorce Reform: Penn-
sylvania Attempts to Break with the Past, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 877, 911-14 (1980) (by rejecting
fault-based conception of divorce, legislature has helped divorced spouses to achieve smooth
transition to separate lives). Moral and economic views expressed in marriage and divorce
laws have progressed. Compare G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES § 149 (1886 & photo. reprint 1971) (marital relation coexistent
with and must have accompanied beginning of creation) with Glendon, Marriage and the
State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 666 (1976) (formalities of mar-
riage left to individuals, state interest more in terms of economic consequences of cohabita-
tion). But see Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L.
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reconciling the differences between the laws of the states.' To a con-
siderable extent, however, the states' marriage and divorce laws remain
a complex and diverse body of rights, responsibilities, and regulations.6
The differences between the states regarding the purpose of the
marriage relationship and the economic and moral attributes of mar-
riage can account partially for the diversity of state laws.' The Supreme
Court has encouraged the diversity of state laws through a reluctance to
interfere with the states' prerogatives in the areas of marriage, divorce,
and family relationships." State power over individuals' conduct through
the operation of marriage and divorce laws, however, is not unlimited.'
Provisions of the Constitution impose a significant limitation on the mar-
riage and divorce laws of the states." Within the last three decades, the
Supreme Court has recognized a number of constitutional rights of in-
dividuals that are distinct from the rights that arise from the marriage
REv. 1169, 1243 (1974) (state regulation of marriage purporting to promote public morality
no longer legitimate by present moral standards).
' See Note, Property Division and Alimony Awards: A Survey of Statutory Limita-
tions on Judicial Discretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 444-45 (1981) (statutory guidelines for
judicial awards of property and alimony are bringing measure of uniformity to decisions)
[hereinafter cited as Survey of Statutory Limitations]. But see R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 9-12 (n.d.) (Prepared for Special Com-
mittee on Divorce of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) (in-
terstate conflict in state laws persists in lack of uniformity).
6 See H. MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 9 (1952) (laws of states in
area of marital property more divergent than almost any other area of law).
' See FAMILY POLICY, GOVERNMENT AND FAMILIES IN FOURTEEN COUNTRIES (S. Kamer-
man & A. Kahn eds. 1978) (range of ethnic, religious, and demographic characteristics of
states leads to pluralistic solutions to problems involving marital relationship); R. WINCH,
THE MODERN FAMILY (rev. ed. 1963) (cultural, racial, religious, class, rural and urban, and
regional differences reflected in laws dealing with marriage); Comment, The Development
of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1269,
1271-72 (1981) (sharing-based community property system influenced by working classes
while individualistic separate property concepts developed in common-law system influenced
by aristocracy) [hereinafter cited as Development of Sharing Principles]. But see Rhein-
stein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries, 18 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 18-19 (1953) (courts are more responsive than legislatures to individualistic
demands with respect to marriage and divorce laws).
' See supra note 1 (Supreme Court statements that domestic relations are matters of
state concern). Federal courts have abstained from exercising diversity jurisdiction over
cases involving marriage, divorce, and family matters. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404
(1975) (domestic relations regarded as virtually exclusive province of states); H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1189-92 (2d ed. 1973) (Supreme
Court doctrine that federal courts are not competent to decide domestic relations issues).
But see Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 804-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (domestic relations ex-
ception to federal jurisdiction based on inaccurate historical grounds).
' See, e.g., Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 22 B.C. L. REv. 935,
949 (1981) (choice of whom to marry is fundamental right that is subject to rigorous due pro-
cess scrutiny when .restricted by state); Developments, supra note 2, at 1309-11 (no funda-
mental right to divorce, but may be prerequisite to full exercise of right to marry).
"0 See generally Developments, supra note 2.
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relationship under state laws.1' The Supreme Court has stated that the
constitutional liberties of individual persons place limits on the extent to
which states can regulate individual behavior by marriage and divorce
laws. 2
The operation of federal statutes presents a further check on the ex-
ercise of state power over marriage and divorce. The supremacy clause"
resolves conflicts between state and federal laws in favor of the federal
power." Since the Constitution leaves the regulation of marriage,
divorce, and related matters to the states, no federal laws exist that pur-
port to govern domestic relations.'5 Attainment of the objectives of
federal laws, however, may conflict with the exercise of state domestic
relations powers. 6 Federal laws that determine the eligibility of persons
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978) (striking statute requiring
court approval for remarriage of person ordered by court to support child of previous mar-
riage); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973) (striking statute limiting opportunity of mar-
ried woman to obtain abortion); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (statute re-
quiring filing fees for divorce beyond means of indigent plaintiffs held unconstitutional);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (statute prohibiting interracial marriage held un-
constitutional).
, See supra note 11 (constitutional rights of individuals limit state regulation of in-
dividual conduct through marriage and divorce legislation).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides that the Constitution and
all laws of the United States enacted pursuant to the Constitution are the supreme law of
the Nation. Id.
" See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267-
269 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK, ROTUNDA & NELSON]. When federal and state laws
conflict, the federal law pre-empts the state law. Id. at 267. Congress may provide expressly
that federal legislation pre-empts state laws dealing with a particular subject. E.g., 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) (pre-empting state laws relating to employee benefit plans regulated
by Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 451
U.S. 504, 522-26 (1981) (explicit congressional statement about pre-emptive effect of legisla-
tion); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 21, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1981) (same). Conflicts
between federal and state laws also may occur in situations in which Congress expressly
has not required pre-emption of state laws. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & NELSON, supra, at 268.
In the absence of direction from Congress on the question of pre-emption, the Supreme
Court has had to determine congressional intent from statutes and other legislative
materials and ascertain the purposes embodied in conflicting federal and state laws. Id. at
268-69; see Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability
of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1586-87 (1977). At different times the Court has
relied on presumptions based upon the Court's conception of the federal form of govern-
ment and the particular subject matter under review. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 626
(1975) (shift from pre-emption doctrine favoring state interests to federal-directed formula-
tion of pre-emption analysis). In pre-emption cases involving state domestic relations laws,
the Supreme Court has stated that conflict alone between federal and state laws will not
lead necessarily to pre-emption. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). State
domestic relations law must do major damage to clear and substantial federal interests. Id.;
see infra text accompanying notes 27-36 (lisquierdo pre-emption test).
" See supra note 1 (Supreme Court statements that no federal law of domestic rela-
tions exists).
" See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210,232 (1981) (conflict between state's com-
1983]
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to receive federal benefits may conflict with state regulation of the
economic aspects of the marriage relationship." Conflict between state
and federal laws may occur when a federal interest involves persons who
are within the scope of federal benefit programs and in relationships
that state marriage law creates. 8 In McCarty v. McCarty,9 for example,
the Supreme Court found that the application of state law governing the
disposition of marital property0 conflicted with the provisions of federal
munity property law and retirement benefits for military personnel); Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1979) (conflict between state's community property law and
federal retirement benefits for railroad employees); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306,
307-08 (1964) (conflict between state's community property law and federal savings bond
regulations); infra note 18 (conflicting meanings in terms of state and federal laws). See
generally Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
" See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 216-17 (1981) (state law governing acquisition
of property by husband and wife). State laws also may require payment of financial support
by one spouse to another upon divorce. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (state
law requiring payment of alimony to wife); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 12 (1975) (state
law requiring payment by divorced spouse for support of children). States also may seek to
regulate the inheritance of property on the basis of family relationships. See, e.g., Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971) (state law definition of child who may inherit from
father); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1905) (state law prescribing intestate succes-
sion of land). On six occasions the Supreme Court has found pre-emption of community prop-
erty laws that conflicted with federal statutes governing the receipt of federal benefits. See
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236 (1981) (military retired pay); Hisquierdo v. Hisquier-
do, 439 U.S. 572, 589-90 (1979) (pension under Railroad Retirement Act 45 U.S.C. § 231
(1976)); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 309 (1964) (United States savings bonds); Free v.
Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962) (same); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 661 (1950) (military
service insurance policy); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382, 390 (1905) (federal land under
Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 170-71 (1976) (repealed 1976)).
18 See supra note 17 (conflict arising when persons claim interests in federal benefits
under state law). In some cases, conflict between state and federal laws occurs when federal
law refers to a relationship under state law. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-82
(1955). In De Sylva, the Supreme Court addressed whether the word 'children' as used in
the Copyright Act included the illegitimate children of a copyright holder. Id. at 581; 17
U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1976) (copyright ownership may pass as personal property according to
law of intestate succession). After repeating the dictum that no federal law of domestic rela-
tions exists, the Court held that state law dealing with relationships created by marriage
should govern. 351 U.S. at 580-81.
"9 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
20 See MARSH, supra note 6, at 11-27 (marital property is aggregate of interests that
arise in one spouse with respect to things acquired by other spouse, solely by virtue of mar-
riage relationship). State laws providing for disposition of property between spouses may
focus on which spouse acquired the property-the so-called separate property systems. See
Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules: Marital Property Reform and the Uniform
Marital Property Act, 23 B.C. L. REV. 761, 762-63 (1982) (court in separate property state
limited to determining title and awarding title accordingly) [hereinafter cited as Marital
Property Reform]. Another system of allocating property between- spouses, equitable
distribution, allows courts to divide property between spouses in a just and fair manner,
subject to statutory guidelines. Id. at 761-62; see Development of Sharing Principles, supra
note 7, at 1282-83 (equitable distribution system allows judges to look beyond title and order
transfer of property from one spouse to other spouse). In community property states, all
property acquired during marriage is the property of both husband and wife, unless one
[Vol. 40:271
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legislation governing the federal benefit of retired pay for retired
members of the military services.2 The McCarty Court reasoned that
the conflict threatened a federal interest, efficient management of the
Nation's armed services, and consequently concluded that the
supremacy clause required pre-emption of the state statute.'
In McCarty, an Army officer who had served eighteen of the twenty
years required for retirement with pay" filed for dissolution of his mar-
riage.24 The trial court dissolved the marriage and, in distributing the
McCartys' property under California's community property statutes,2
ordered Colonel McCarty to pay approximately forty-five percent of his
total monthly retired pay to his wife.2 6 The Supreme Court in McCarty
party can demonstrate that the property is his separate property. W. DE FUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 1, 1-2 (2d ed. 1971).
21 453 U.S. at 232.
Id. at 234-36; see infra text accompanying notes 33-37 (application of state's com-
munity property law threat to twin objectives of military compensation system).
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3911, 3914 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). An Army officer may retire from
active service after at least twenty years of service. Id. § 3911. An enlisted member of the
Army may retire after at least twenty years of active service and ten years of service in the
Army Reserve. Id. § 3914. Both retired officers and enlisted members are entitled to receive
retired pay. Id. § 3929. The amount of retired pay a retired service member may receive is a
function of his rank at retirement and the length of his service. Id. § 3991. Length of service
requirements and retired pay provisions are essentially the same for all branches of the
military services. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 213 n.5.
24 453 U.S. at 216.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1982). Section 4800(a) requires a trial court
in a divorce action to divide all of the community and quasi-community property of the par-
ties. Id. Quasi-community property is property that either spouse acquired while domiciled
in a state other than California, that would have been community property if the acquiring
spouse had been domiciled in California at the time of acquisition. Id. § 4803(a); DE FUNIAK &
VAUGHN, supra note 20, at §§ 68.3, 153 (concept of quasi-community property involves move-
ment of spouses between community property and noncommunity property states).
' 453 U.S. at 218. The percentage amount of retired pay awarded to the wife in Mc-
Carty represented one-half of the ratio between the period of Colonel McCarty's military
service while he was married to the total length of his military service. Id. Other courts
have used a pro rata method to determine a former spouse's share of a military service
member's retired pay. See, e.g., In re Miller, __ Mont. -, -, 609 P.2d 1185, 1186
(1980) (wife to receive percentage amount of husband's monthly check), vacated sub nom.,
Miller v. Miller, - U.S. -, ., 101 S. Ct. 3152 (1981); In re Pea, 17 Wash. App. 728,
731, 566 P.2d 212, 214 (1977) (percentage formula based on extent of community contribu-
tions).
The trial court ordered Colonel McCarty to pay 45% of his monthly retired pay to his
wife and retained jurisdiction to supervise the payments. 453 U.S. at 218. Other courts have
used the pro rata method of determining a former spouse's share of retired pay, but have
ordered the retired service member to pay the spouse's share in a lump sum based upon the
service member's actuarial life expectancy. See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, -, 535
P.2d 53, 60 (1975) (lump sum award required under Idaho community property law), over-
ruled, Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85 -, 645 P.2d 319, 321 (1982) (following McCarty decision).
A dissenting justice in Ramsey pointed out that the lump sum award probably would
bankrupt the husband. Id. at 684, 535 P.2d at 65 (Bakes, J., dissenting). The dissent's predic-
tion was correct. See In re Ramsey, 612 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) (discharge in
1983]
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applied a test for pre-emption that the Court had established in His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo.' In a domestic relations context, the Hisquierdo
Court concluded, the supremacy clause pre-empted state laws that con-
flicted with federal legislation.28 Applying the Hisquierdo test, the Mc-
Carty Court first found a conflict between the provisions of the military
retired pay statutes and the community property right that Mrs. McCarty
claimed.' An examination of various provisions of federal law dealing
with military benefits 0 led the McCarty Court to conclude that Congress
had intended military retired pay to be a military service member's
3 1
bankruptcy of lump sum military retired pay awarded to wife); Bowman, Lump-Sum Divi-
sion of Military Retired Pay: A Dissenting View, 3 COMM. PROP. J. 135, 141 (1976) (wife may
receive favorable lump sum judgment but virtually no judicial relief); cf. In re Vogt, 14
Bankr. 743, 748 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (fractional interest in retired pay payable upon
receipt be service member is not dischargeable in bankruptcy).
2 439 U.S. 572 (1979). The Hisquierdo case involved a spouse's claim for a community
property interest in benefits paid under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974. Id. at 579-81;
see 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1976). The Hisquierdo Court found that the application of community
property law to benefits paid under the Railroad Retirement Act threatened the federal in-
terest of providing for the economic security of retired railroad employees. Id. at 588-90.
The potential injury to the congressional protection of railroad retirees required pre-
emption of the community property law. Id. at 590.
' 439 U.S. at 581-83. The pre-emption analysis in Hisquierdo consisted of a two-step
examination. First, the right to federal benefits asserted under state law must conflict with
the express terms of federal law. Id. at 583. Second, the consequences of the conflict must
injure sufficiently the objectives of a federal program to require pre-emption. Id. The His-
quierdo Court characterized its approach to the pre-emption question as practical and stated
that the federal nature of the retirement benefits did not pre-empt state laws that purport
to control federal benefits. Id.
' 453 U.S. at 232.
30 Id. at 223-32. The McCarty Court noted that a retired service member may
designate a person to receive arrearages of retired pay at his death, citing a case dealing
with a similar provision concerning proceeds paid under the National Service Life Insurance
Act. Id. at 224-26; see Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 658 (1950) (proceeds of policy belong
only to beneficiary named by serviceman). The Court next examined two statutory schemes
allowing a service member to fund an annuity for his surviving spouse and children. 453
U.S. at 226-28. The Court reasoned that because a service member could choose not to fund
an annuity or to fund an annuity only for his surviving children, Congress had intended
retired pay to be the personal entitlement of the service member. Id. at 227. Finally, the
Court noted that a former spouse cannot attach the service member's retired pay to satisfy
a property settlement following a divorce. Id. at 228; see also 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) (federal law permitting garnishment of retired or retainer pay for alimony or child
support); infra text accompanying notes 156-64 (restriction of garnishment process to
alimony and child support obligations).
"' See Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, PuB. L. No. 97-252, §
1002(a), 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) -730-731 (codified at 10 U.S.C.A. §
1408(a)(5), (6) (Supp. 3 1982)). Throughout this note, the terms 'service member' and 'former
spouse' follow the usage in the Act. Unless otherwise indicated, references to "former
spouse" mean the wife or ex-wife of a military service member. See Note, Military Retire-
ment Pay Not Subject to Division as Community Property Upon Divorce: McCarty v. Mc-
Carty, 19 Hous. L. REv. 5.91, 596 (1982) (percentage of retired female service members was
miniscule until very recently) [hereinafter cited as Military Retirement Pay].
[Vol. 40:271
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personal entitlement and thus not subject to division under state law
between a service member and his spouse. 2
The Supreme Court further concluded that the division of Colonel
McCarty's military retired pay by the trial court threatened the objec-
tives of the military compensation system." The McCarty Court noted
that by reducing the amounts that Congress had deemed adequate for
the service member's needs, 4 division of military retired pay would
discourage a service member from funding-an annuity for his surviving
spouse and dependent children from his share of retired pay. In addi-
tion, the Court noted that the trial court's decision would diminish the
value of military retired pay as a means by which Congress could assure
a youthful and vigorous military. 8 The McCarty Court stated expressly
that Congress' constitutional power to control the armed forces left the
trial court with no authority to disturb the policies expressed in the
military compensation system2'
The McCarty decision upset a clearly established trend in state law
453 U.S. at 224, 232.
' Id. at 232-35. The McCarty Court noted that two objectives of the military compen-
sation system are income maintenance and personnel management. Id. at 213. Military
retired pay provides for the needs of retired service members and operates as an induce-
ment for recruiting and re-enlistment purposes. Id.; see Preliminary Review of Military
Retirement Systems: Hearings Before the Military Compensation Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1977-78).
1 453 U.S. at 233.
3 Id. at 226-28; see supra note 30 (annuity for surviving spouse).
' 453 U.S. at 234-35. The McCarty Court reasoned that division of retired pay would
disrupt the military personnel management system in two ways. Id. First, a division of
retired pay would discourage a service member from retiring by reducing the amount
available to him. Id. at 235. A service member, therefore, would continue in the service
since any retired pay attributable to post-divorce service would be the member's separate
property. Id. The Court concluded that the disincentive to retirement would frustrate a con-
gressional goal of assuring youthful military forces. Id. Second, the Court recognized that
not all states require division of military retired pay between spouses upon divorce. Id.
Since a service member might be transferred to a state that divided retired pay, the value
of retired pay as an inducement for enlistment or re-enlistment was diminished. Id. at 234.
The McCarty Court did not consider the extent to which court awards of alimony or child
support from retired pay might diminish the value of retired pay as an incentive. With the
exception of Texas, all states provide for some form of alimony or child support. See
Military Retirement Pay, supra note 31, at 598 (alimony after final divorce decree against
public policy in Texas).
7 453 U.S. at 235-36. The McCarty Court suggested that Congress could act to provide
greater protection for the former spouses of service members. Id. The suggestion reflected
a traditional reluctance by the Supreme Court to question Congress' exercise of constitu-
tional powers over war and military affairs. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-68
(1981) (conscription of men only is constitutional); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 509-10
(1975) (different promotion policy for female officers is constitutional). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cls. 12-14 (power granted to Congress to raise, support, and discipline regular army and
navy forces). But see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967) (national defense
does not sanction subversion of constitutional right to free association).
1983]
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to find spousal interests in military benefits.' Before McCarty, a number
of courts in both the community property states" and the common-law
states" had treated military retired pay the same as private pensions,"
subject to division between spouses as a form of property.42 A number of
state courts that held that retired pay is marital property focused
analysis on the attributes of retired pay and concluded that retired pay
is a form of deferred compensation for a service member's past
services. 3 The service member's years of active service and the rank he
held at retirement determine the amount of retired or retainer pay the
member receives.44 State courts that held in favor of the divisibility of
retired pay discounted the current compensation aspects of retired pay,
concluding that retired pay is not compensation to a service member
who faces a real risk of continued service obligations after his retire-
ment.45 State courts that divided retired pay reasoned that retired pay,
See Bass, Update: Division at Divorce of ERISA Pensions and Other Benefit Plans,
6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 4, at 4001-03 (1979) (all community property states and several
common-law states addressing question of military retired pay have held in favor of spousal
interest in retired pay); infra text accompanying notes 39-48 (courts holding that retired pay
is divisible marital property).
" See DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 20, § 1 at 1. The community property states
are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Id.
The community property system also prevails in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Id.
40 See Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview as of September
1982, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 46, at 4065 (1982). With the exception of Mississippi and
West Virginia, all common-law states essentially provide for equitable distribution of prop-
erty upon divorce. Id. at 4079-83 (listing states). See generally Marital Property Reform,
supra note 20; Development of Sharing Principles, supra note 7.
41 See generally Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social
Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown an ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 417 (1978);
Thiede, The Commuity Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private
Employee Retirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 635 (1975).
42 See Linson v. Linson, 618 P.2d 748, 754 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980) (retired pay properly
considered part of marital estate); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, -, 535 P.2d 53-56
(1975) (retired pay is earned property right based on member's service); In re Schissel, 292
N.W.2d 421, 427 (Iowa 1980) (trial court properly took retired pay into account in property
division); Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 470, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977) (once eligibility re-
quirements met, retired pay is property subject to equitable distribution). But see Fenney
v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, __, 537 S.W.2d 367, 367 (1976) (right to retired pay not personal
property within meaning of state statute); Ellis v. Ellis, 191 Colo. 317, -, 552 P.2d 506,
507 (1976) (en bane) (retired pay not property since it has no surrender, redemption, or lump
sum value).
"s See In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 604, 517 P.2d 449, 456-57, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376-77
(en banc) (retirement pay awarded for services previously rendered by service member),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974).
" See supra note 30 (description of service member's entitlement to receive retired or
retainer pay).
41 See Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So.2d 461, 464 (La. App. 1975) (incorrect to characterize
retirement pay as current compensation); LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, __, 453 P.2d
755, 756 (1969) (possibility that service member may be recalled during national emergency
does not make retirement pay compensation for present or future demands of government).
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considered as a right to receive money after retirement, was a form of
property that the service member had earned during marriage.4"
Although the right of a service member to receive retired pay is not ab-
solute,47 courts that divided retired pay between spouses concluded that
the possibility that a service member would not receive retired pay
should not defeat a former spouse's interest in marital property.48
State courts holding that military retired pay is not subject to divis-
ion between spouses emphasized the attributes of retired pay that would
support a characterization of retired pay as current compensation for
present services.49 Retired service members remain subject to military
discipline. 0 A retired officer may forfeit his right to receive retired pay
upon court-martial,5' by engaging in certain prohibited activities," or by
receiving other forms of government compensation.' Moreover, retired
service members may be subject to recall into active service.5 Courts
" See supra note 42 (cases holding that retired pay is subject to division as marital
property between spouses).
"T See infra text accompanying notes 51-54 (circumstances under which service
member may lose right to receive retired or retainer pay).
"' See, e.g., Linson v. Linson, 618 P.2d 748, 750-51 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980) (emphasizing
equity in awarding portion of retired pay to former spouse of career service member;
Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 706, 267 N.W.2d 155, 159 (1978) (correct approach is
to categorize retired pay as deferred compensation), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 940 (1979);
Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 468, 375 A.2d 659, 662-63 (1977) (right to receive retired pay
is economic asset subject to equitable distribution); Ables v. Ables, 540 S.W.2d 769, 770
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (real consideration for retired pay was service member's thirty years
of service, not post-retirement duties).
'" See Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, -, 537 S.W.2d 367, 367 (1976) (right to
receive retirement pay is not personal property within meaning of state law); Ellis v. Ellis,
191 Colo. 317, 319, 552 P.2d 506, 507 (1976) (retired pay is not property under state law).
Other courts declined to address whether retired pay constituted property or current com-
pensation. See Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Alaska 1979) (supremacy clause prohibits
application of state property settlement concepts to retired pay), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922
(1981).
' See 10 U.S.C. § 802(4) (1976) (retired members of regular service component entitled
to pay are subject to Code of Military Justice).
"' See Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982, 988 (Ct. Cl.) (retired service member
validly dismissed from Navy no longer entitled to retired pay), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 977
(1964).
" See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (person holding office or trust under United
States may not accept employment or gift from foreign state without congressional con-
sent); 37 U.S.C. § 801(b) (Supp. V 1981) (prohibiting retired officer from selling supplies to
Department of Defense or other designated agencies within three years after retirement);
50 Op. Comp. GEN. 566, 568-69 (1979) (renouncing United States citizenship may result in loss
of retired pay).
" See 5 U.S.C. § 5532 (Supp. V 1981) (loss of retired pay for employment in federal civil
service); infra text accompanying notes 141-46 (waiver of military retired pay to receive
Veterans Administration disability pension).
" See 10 U.S.C. § 688 (Supp. V 1981). Section 688(a) authorizes the secretaries of the
military departments to order a retired service member to active duty at any time. Id. A
retired member recalled to active service is entitled to promotions and to increased retired
pay based upon promotion in rank during his active service. Id. § 6151(b)(1).
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that declined to divide retired pay concluded that the current compensa-
tion aspects of retired pay precluded a characterization of retired pay as
a form of marital property."5
The McCarty Court expressly left open the question whether
military retired pay is deferred compensation for completed past ser-
vices or current compensation for reduced present services.' The Court
concluded that under the pre-emption analysis of Hisquierdo, the Court
did not have to address Colonel McCarty's contention that his retired
pay was current compensation and thus not subject to division as com-
munity property under California law. 7 Instead, the McCarty Court ex-
pressed a traditional reluctance to interfere with congressional actions
in the area of military affairs. 8 Noting that Congress had described
retired pay as the personal entitlement of a military service member,
the McCarty Court reasoned that Congress had prohibited the states
from treating retired pay as marital property. 9 The McCarty decision
rendered moot any consideration of military retired pay under a marital
property analysis by emphasizing the congressional intent to pre-empt
state laws that the Court found in the retired pay statutes.0 Courts in
post-McCarty cases held that the McCarty rationale applied equally to
the marital property laws in noncommunity property states. 1
The McCarty Court suggested that other means provided by state
" See supra note 49 (cases holding that retired pay is not marital property subject to
division between spouses).
' 453 U.S. at 223. The McCarty Court, stated in a footnote that Congress may have in-
tefided retired pay to be current compensation for the restrictions on retired service
members and the risk of recall to active service. Id. at 223 n.16. The Court then suggested
that a possible congressional intention of retired pay as current compensation required the
states to act with caution in treating'retired pay as divisible property. Id.
5 Id. at 216-17. Colonel McCarty had argued without success in the lower courts that
as current compensation his retired pay was his separate property under California law. Id.
at 217; see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 518, 519 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982) (earnings of each spouse
while living separate and apart are separate property).
I See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 236 (noting Supreme Court's deference to congressional
control of military affairs); supra note 37 (Supreme Court's deference to congressional war
power in absence of threat to constitutional liberties).
453 U.S. at 233.
o See id. at 221-32. The McCarty Court's analysis led to the conclusion that Congress
had intended military retired pay as a service member's personal entitlement. Id. at 224,
232; see S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3294, 3300. The Senate Report referred to military retired pay as the service
member's personal entitlement in terms of congressional consideration of a new provision
allowing service members to fund survivors' annuities from retired pay. Id.
"1 See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, __, 645 P.2d 319, 321 (1982) (no indication that
McCarty intended to cover only community property states); Gronquist v. Gronquist, 7 Kan.
App. 2d 583, -, 644 P.2d 1365, 1366-67 (1982) (personal entitlement characterization of
retired pay makes community property-equitable distribution distinction unnecessary); Hill
v. Hill, 291 Md. 615, 620, 436 A.2d 67, 70 (1981) (McCarty rationale applies equally to
equitable distribution states); Grotelueschen v. Grotelueschen, 113 Mich. App. 395, 404, 318
N.W.2d 227, 231 (1982) (overruling previous decision holding retired pay to be marital asset).
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and federal law could mitigate any harsh consequences resulting from
the McCarty decision.2 The decision effectively limited the former
spouse of a military service member, who before McCarty received
financial support by sharing in a service member's retired pay on the
basis of marital property right," to other means of support based on
need, such as alimony and child support payments. 4 Significant dif-
ferences, however, exist between the states with respect to court
authority to award a former spouse alimony or child support.
Mechanisms for enforcing alimony or child support provisions of divorce
decrees are not fully effective.66 The McCarty Court further compounded
the economic plight of the former spouse by prohibiting awards of other
marital property to offset the value of retired pay.67 The McCarty decis-
62 453 U.S. at 230, 235. The McCarty Court suggested that the availability of garnish-
ment to satisfy alimony and child support obligations represented a congressional provision
for the needs of former spouses. Id. at 230; see infra text accompanying notes 155-64 (federal
statute permitting garnishment for alimony and child support obligations).
" See supra text accompanying notes 38-55 (state court decisions question whether
retired pay constitutes marital property).
See Higgins v. Higgins, 408 So.2d 731, 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (McCarty deci-
sion allows court to consider retired pay in determining alimony award); Gronquist v. Gron-
quist, 7 Kan. App.2d 583, -, 644 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1982) (same); Rust v. Rust, 321 N.W.2d
504, 507-08 (N.D. 1982) (McCarty does not preclude consideration of retired pay to set
alimony award).
" See generally Survey of Statutory Limitations, supra note 5. State laws differ with
respect to awards of alimony based upon a former spouse's needs. See id. at 426-43; supra
note 6 (differences in state views on economic aspects of marriage). The amount of alimony
awarded may vary from state to state depending on whether the courts consider, among
other factors, the financial resources of the spouses, their ages and health, their earning
capacities, and the amount of marital property each spouse has received. Survey of
Statutory Limitations, supra note 5, at 428-29. In addition, some 'states still consider the
cause of the divorce and the presence of fault in determining an alimony award. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-82 (West Supp. 1982) (court to consider cause of divorce); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 452.335(2)(7) (Vernon 1977) (court to consider conduct of party seeking maintenance);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 501(b)(14) (Purdon Supp. 1982-83) (court shall consider marital
misconduct prior to divorce in determining amount of alimony).
" See Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Tex. 1981) (court may not use contempt
power to prevent service member from exercising right granted under federal law); Ex
parte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1979) (same). But see Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d
550, 555 (5th Cir. 1981) (service member may nQt defeat wife's award of alimony through
discharge in bankruptcy), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1443 (1982).
" 453 U.S. at 229 n.22; see Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 588-90 (1979). The
Hisquierdo Court prohibited an award of other marital property to the wife to offset the ef-
fect of the Court's holding that Railroad Retirement Act benefits are not divisible upon
divorce. Id. The Court reasoned that to allow an offsetting award of other property would
achieve the same effect as a division of the husband's retirement benefits. Id. at 588. Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting in McCarty, contended that the absence of a statutory prohibition
against anticipation or attachment in the retired pay system did not support application of
the Hisquierdo holding in the case of retired pay. 453 U.S. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The McCarty majority relied on a nineteenth-century case that involved an attempt to at-
tach military pay before the government had paid the service member. Id. at 229-30; see
Buchanan v. Alexander, 16 U.S. (4 How.) 20, 21 (1845) (diversion of appropriated funds would
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ion was a serious setback for the former spouses of career military ser-
vice members, who in many cases had acquired few separate assets or
pension rights of their own.68 Criticism of the McCarty decision focused
on the fairness of the decision69 and the strong interest of the states in
determining economic relationships between spouses upon dissolution of
marriage.7 o
To remedy the problems that McCarty created, Congress enacted
the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (Act) in Septem-
ber, 1982.7' The Act resolves some of the difficulties former spouses en-
countered in their attempt to share in military benefits both before and
after the McCarty decision.72 The Act removes the McCarty prohibition
against dividing retired or retainer pay by authorizing courts to divide
retired or retainer pay between a service member and his former spouse
according to state laws dealing with marital property.73 The Act also
establishes a mechanism through which a former spouse may receive
payments of her share of retired or retainer pay directly from the
federal government.74 The direct payment mechanism obviates some of
suspend functions of federal government); see also Applegate v. Applegate, 39 F. Supp. 887,
889-90 (E.D. Va. 1941) (attachment of funds in hands of government violates doctrine of
sovereign immunity).
68 See Military Retirement Pay, supra note 31, at 596-98 (former spouses of service
members often without personal resources); Hearings on H.R. 2817, H.R. 3677 and H.R.
6270 Before the Subcommittee on Military Compensation of the House Committee on Armed
Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 23 (1980) (frequent change of residence prevents permanent
employment and acquisition of pension rights by service member's spouse) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on House Resolution].
" See Goodman, Divorce Military Style, Wash. Post, April 27, 1982, § A, at 19 (McCar-
ty Court ignored financial plight of service members' former spouses).
.70 See, e.g., Kornfeld, Supreme Court Majority Shoots Down Community Property
Division of Military Retirement Pay, 8 COMM. PROP. J. 187, 187 (1981) (agreeing with Mc-
Carty dissent that majority decision was both unprecedented and incorrect); Raggio, Mc-
Carty v. McCarty: The Moving Target of Federal Preemption Threatening All Non-
Employee Spouses, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 505, 506-10 (1982) (McCarty Court cannot maintain
plausibly that Congress intended to pre-empt state law); Military Retirement Pay, supra
note 31, at 594-96 (McCarty Court inclined to find pre-emption when congressional intent
unclear).
7 Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 730 (adding 10 U.S.C. § 1408 and amending 10 U.S.C. §§
1072, 1076, 1086, 1447, 1448 and 1450). See S. REP. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1627 (additional views of Senator Denton)
(providing financial protection is an exercise of congressional responsibility) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE REPORT].
' See infra text accompanying notes 84-88 (Act removing McCarty prohibition against
division of retired or retainer pay); infra text accompanying notes 95-105 (Act provides for
direct payment of retired or retainer pay to a former spouse); infra text accompanying notes
160-64 (Act provides direct payment of other property awarded to former spouse).
- 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(1) (Supp. 3 1982); see infra text accompanying notes 84-93
(authorization for state courts to divide retired or retainer pay if state law permits).
" 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d)(1) (Supp. 3 1982); see infra text accompanying notes 94-105
(direct payment of retired or retainer pay to former spouse).
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the difficulties in enforcing the economic terms of state divorce
decrees.7
5
Although the Act significantly improves the opportunity of a service
member's former spouse to secure adequate financial support, several
problems remain.76 The Act expressly limits direct payments of retired
or retainer pay to former spouses who satisfy a length-of-marriage re-
quirement.7' Further, the secretaries of the military service branches,
who are responsible under the Act for making payments to a former
spouse, will not honor court orders based upon improper jurisdiction over
a service member.78 The treatment of marital property distributions under
the bankruptcy laws 79 and a service member's election to receive a
veteran's pension in lieu of retired or retainer pay also may hinder the
efforts of a former spouse to reach the service member's military
benefits.' Finally, constitutional limitations prevented Congress from
entirely eliminating the effect of the McCarty decision.8 To avoid a
I See, e.g., In re Ramsey, 612 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) (lump sum award of
retired pay to former spouse was dischargeable when service member declared
bankruptcy); Anderson v. Anderson, 285 Md. 515, 526, 404 A.2d 275, 281 (1979) (state law
more restrictive than federal statute limiting amount of government compensation subject
to garnishment); United States v. Stelter, 567 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. 1978) (service member
beyond jurisdiction of divorce court's contempt power to enforce community property divi-
sion).
, See infra text accompanying notes 77-83 (limitations in Act and operation of other
laws may prevent former spouse from securing benefits of Act).
" See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d)(2) (Supp. 3 1982). To receive direct payment of retired or
retainer pay, a former spouse must have been married to a service member for at least ten
years. Id.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 43-45 (ten-year marriage requirement
necessary to ensure equitable treatment of military service members).
", See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 3 1982); infra text accompanying notes 106-07
(proper jurisdiction over service member necessary for effective service of court order).
" See supra note 26 (discharge in bankruptcy of wife's share of retired pay).
" See infra text accompanying notes 142-53 (effect of service member's election to
receive Veterans Administration pension in lieu of retired pay).
" See generally Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroac-
tive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960). For a prominent illustration of a Supreme
Court decision that prompted a legislative response by Congress see Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). In Mt. Clemens, the Court construed the meaning
of 'working time' with regard to the overtime compensation requirement of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. Id. at 686, 692; see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1976) (overtime compensation
requirement of Fair Labor Standards Act). The result of the Court's decision was an addi-
tional five billion dollars in overtime claims. Hochman, supra at 721. One year after the Mt.
Clemens case, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act, PUB. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84
(codified at 29 U.S.C. 251-262 (1976)). See H. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. I.
reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1029, 1030-35 (Congress intended Portal-to-
Portal Act to eliminate litigation following Supreme Court's Mt. Clemens decision).
Although the Supreme Court never decided a case involving the constitutionality of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, most federal appeals courts upheld the Act as a valid exercise of con-
gressional authority. See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 262 (2d Cir. 1948)
(Act did not disturb final judgments under the Mt. Clemens case); Seese v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 168 F.2d 58, 62 (4th Cir. 1948) (enactment of Portal-to-Portal Act had same effect as
repeal of Fair Labor Standards Act provision at issue in Mt. Clemens case). One commen-
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legislative reversal of the Supreme Court's decision in McCarty,82 Con-
gress placed restrictions in the Act that may foreclose some former
spouses in pre-McCarty cases from securing the benefits of the Act.'
The Act benefits former spouses who are eligible for protection
under the Act by eliminating the McCarty prohibition against division of
military retired or retainer pay upon divorce. 4 The Act adds section
1408 to title 10 of the United States Code. 5 Section 1408(c)(1) authorizes
state courts to consider retired or retainer pay as property solely of a
military service member or as property of a service member and his
spouse. The McCarty Court had reasoned that since Congress had
referred to retired or retainer pay as the personal entitlement of a ser-
vice member," states could not consider retired or retainer pay as a
form of marital property. Section 1408(c)(1) eliminates the basis of the
McCarty decision by giving state courts express authority to divide
retired or retainer pay. 9 By returning the treatment of retired or re-
tator has suggested that the constitutionality of retroactive legislation depends upon policy
considerations such as the reliance of persons on existing law, the purpose of the retroactive
legislation, and any unfairness fn the operation of ietroactive statutes. Hochman, supra at
726-27. No issue should arise as to the constitutionality of the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act because the Act does not purport to change the result of cases in
which judgments became final before the McCarty decision. See infra text accompanying
notes 128-33 (Act's application to cases in which final judgments have been obtained).
See C. SANDS, 2 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.08 (4th ed. 1973)
(legislation rendering court judgment ineffective is per se objectionable).
" See infra text accompanying notes 129-33 (benefits of Act do not extend to former
spouses whose divorce decrees became final before McCarty decision).
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 16; see McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235-36
(1981). The McCarty Court held that the congressional scheme of military compensation pre-
empted state marital property laws. Id. at 232-33. The Court based its conclusion on a find-
ing that the application of state marital property law to military retired pay would frustrate
the objectives of the military compensation system. Id. at 234-35; see supra text accompany-
ing notes 33-37 (frustration of congressional intent in enacting military compensation
statutes). With regard to the extent federal courts may review state laws, one commentator
has described the Supreme Court's role as partly functional. See Choper, supra note 14, at
1586-87. Due to a lack of procedures for examining the impact of local laws and the
pressures of ordinary business, Congress may not be able to determine whether local laws
will conflict with the broad purposes of federal legislation. Id. The Supreme Court, however,
may be more suited than Congress to examine state law effects and balance state and na-
tional interests since the Court can gather and apply detailed evidence of a particular law's
legislation history and administration. Id.
- 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (Supp. 3 1982).
" Id. § 1408(c)(1).
See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 224-32 (1981) (congressional characterization
of retired pay as service member's personal entitlement); S. REP. No. 4180, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3294, 3300. The Senate Report refer-
red to military retired pay as the personal entitlement of a service member in terms of con-
gressional consideration of a provision allowing service members to fund survivors' an-
nuities from the member's retired pay. Id.
" Se453 U.S. at 226-27 (community property division of retired pay inconsistent with
congressional intent to make retired pay personal entitlement of service member).
89 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(1) (Supp. 3 1982) (authority of state courts to divide retired
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tainer pay to state law, Congress avoided the creation by the courts of a
federal common-law rule to govern retired or retainer pay." Unless Con-
gress acts further to establish a comprehensive federal law of marital
property rights in government benefits," a former spouse who seeks to
share in a service member's retired or retainer pay must look to state
law.2 When the Act becomes effective in 1983, a former spouse will be
able to share in retired or retainer pay only if state law permits. 3
The Act also mitigates the problems that a former spouse faces in
collecting retired or retainer pay that a court has awarded to the former
spouse under state law. 4 Section 1408(d)(1) provides for direct payments
of retired or retainer pay to a former spouse. 5 The former spouse,
however, must have been married to a military service member for at
least ten years prior to the date of a divorce decree. The former spouse
also must serve a copy of the court order directing payment of retired or
retainer pay upon the appropriate military service secretary. 7
or retainer pay); SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 16 (issue of wheher to divide retired or
retainer pay is matter for state courts to decide).
0 See Reppy, supra note 41, at 508-11. One commentator on community property laws
has suggested that courts must employ a federal common-law rule to resolve issues arising
from pre-emption of state laws. Id. at 508 n.322. Since the express purpose of the Act is to
return the treatment of retired or retainer pay to state law, courts will not need to consider
whether a federal common-law property rule governs military compensation. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 71, at 16 (state court authority to decide whether retired or retainer pay
is divisible between spouses retroactive to June 26, 1981).
" Cf. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 224. The McCarty Court referred to a limited
community property right incorporated in the Railroad Retirement Act. Id.; see 45 U.S.C. §
231d(c)(3) (1976). The Railroad Retirement Act provides a separate annuity for a
nonemployee spouse. Id The annuity ceases upon the divorce of the spouse from the
railroad employee. Id.; Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 584 (1979) (separate annuity
for spouse under Railroad Retirement Act). The McCarty Court also referred to a provision
of the Foreign Service retirement system designed to protect former spouses. 453 U.S. at
230-32. The former spouse of a Foreign Service member is entitled to a pro rata share of the
member's retirement benefits. 22 U.S.C. § 4054(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
92 See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (Supp. 3 1982) (state law to decide whether retired or re-
tainer pay is divisible marital property).
"3 See Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, §
1006(a), 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (96 Stat.) 730, 737. The provisions of the Act
become effective on February 1, 1983. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 128-29 (limita-
tions on court authority to divide retired or retainer pay and payments of retired or re-
tainer pay to former spouse).
, See supra note 75 (difficulties in enforcing terms of divorce decree).
" 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d)(1) (Supp. 3 1982).
Id. § 1408(d)(2). Section 1408(d)(2) prohibits any direct payments of retired or re-
tainer pay to a former spouse if the former spouse was not married to the service member
for at least ten years. Id. The former spouse also must have been married during ten years
of military service creditable in determining the service member's eligibility for retired or
retainer pay. Id. During consideration of the Act in the House, the ten-year marriage re-
quirement prompted several objections. See 128 CONG. REC. H4730-32 (daily ed. July 28,
1982) (floor debate). The ten-year marriage requirement in the Act applies only to direct
payments of retired or retainer pay to a former spouse. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d)(2) (Supp. 3
1982).
, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d)(1) (Supp. 3 1982). The Act defines a court order as a final
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Several provisions of the Act govern effective service and set out
the requirements of qualifying court orders. 8 The former spouse may
serve the court order by personal service or by certified or registered
mail.9 The former spouse also may serve an agent whom the service
secretary has designated to receive service of court orders.i0 To con-
stitute effective service, a court order must be regular on its face.1"' The
Act provides that a court order is regular on its face if the order con-
tains certain data identifying the service member 10 and certifies that the
trial court issuing the order observed the rights of the service member
under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. 1 3 Section 1408(b)(2) fur-
ther provides that a court order is regular on its face if the order gives
no reasonable indication that a court issued the order without lawful
authority. 4 Section 1408(c)(4) expressly prohibits state courts without
proper jurisdiction over a service member from dividing retired or re-
tainer pay between the service member and a former spouse."'
For the purposes of the Act, a court may assert jurisdiction over
military service members on the basis of a service member's residence
or domicile within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or by the
member's consent.' Section 1408(c)(4) provides that a service member's
military assignment to a court's territorial jurisdiction will not supply
decree of divorce that orders payment of retired or retainer pay to a former spouse or an
order that approves or ratifies a property settlement incident to a final decree of divorce.
Id. § 1408(a)(2)(C). Under section 1408(a)(2) a divorce decree is a final decree of divorce,
dissolution, annulment, or legal separation. Id- § 1408(a)(2). The decree may express the
amount of the former spouse's share of retired or retainer pay as a certain sum of dollars or
as a percentage of the service member's disposable monthly retired or retainer pay. Id §
1408(a)(2}(C); see supra note 26 (court award of retired pay either as percentage of monthly
amount or in lump sum).
" See infra text accompanying notes 99-104 (requirements of qualifying court orders).
- 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(b)(1) (Supp. 3 1982).
100 Id.
Id § 1408(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 3 1982).
"9 Id. at § 1408(b)(1)(C). A court order and any documents accompanying the court
order served on a service secretary must identify the service member and contain the ser-
vice member's social security number. Id.
" 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-591 (1976). The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act provides
certain protections to military service members who are involved in civil litigation. See id §
510. Section 521 provides that a service member in active service or within 60 days after he
leaves active service is entitled to a continuance of any proceedings. Id § 521. The service
member may demand a continuance under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act as a
matter of right. Id.; Bond v. Bond, 547 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). A trial court
must grant the continuance unless the opposing party shows that the service member's
military duties do not impair materially the service member's ability to prosecute or defend
the action. 547 S.W.2d at 44. See generally Allshouse, Overcoming the Obstacles of the
Soldiers' and Sailors'Relief Act, 3 FAM. ADVoc. 36 (1981).
"' See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 3 1982); infra note 124 (comparison of collateral
attacks on garnishment orders for lack of proper jurisdiction).




jurisdiction based upon residence.""1 Divorce jurisdiction over military
personnel has presented constitutional problems to the courts.' 8 The
Supreme Court never has stated unequivocally the bases of jurisdiction
over divorce matters.' 9 The Court, however, has favored domicile as a
constitutional prerequisite to valid jurisdiction over divorce matters.10
Military personnel subject to assignment within any state may not be
able to manifest the necessary intent to establish the duty state as their
domicile."' Moreover, the Department of Defense has expressed concern
over the divergent treatment of retired or retainer pay among the
states.' 2 Since military service members face the possibility of assign-
ment to a state that divides retired or retainer pay between spouses,
divergent treatment of retired or retainer pay by the states may impair
the flexibility of personnel assignment policies."'
To resolve some of the difficulties in applying the preference for
domicile to the situation of military personnel, several states have
adopted special military servicemen's statutes."' The statutes typically
provide jurisdiction on the basis of either a service member's residence
within a state or his assignment within a state for a certain period of
107 Id.
'°8 Compare Viernes v. District Court, 181 Colo. 284, -, 509 P.2d 306, 310 (1973) (en
banc) (state statute providing jurisdiction after 90 day residence within state invalid in view
of constitutional requirement of domicile) with Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24, 25
(Alaska 1964) (domicile is not sole basis for divorce jurisdiction unless statute requires). See
also Garfield, supra note 1, at 526-32 (unsettled law on jurisdiction for military divorces in
absence of definitive Supreme Court statement); Note, Conflict of Laws: Limitations on the
"Domicile of Choice" of Military Servicemen, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 167, 172-75 (1978) (general-
ized concept of military compulsion inappropriate for determination of serviceman's
domicile) [hereinafter cited as Military Domicile].
'" See Garfield, supra note 1, at 502-03 (Supreme Court dicta requiring domicile for
valid jurisdiction).
"I See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409-10 (1975) (upholding statute requiring one-
year residence notwithstanding showing of domicile); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226, 229 (1945) (judicial power to grant divorces is based on domicile). The concept of
domicile includes two components. To create domicile, a person must establish residence
within a state, manifested by maintenance of a home within the state. See Military
Domicile, supra note 108, at 167-72. The person also must manifest an intention to return to
his home within that state. Id.
... See infra note 117 (element of coercion involved in military assignment may negate
intent element of domicile).
"' See Hearings on House Resolutions, supra note 68, at 58, 63 (concern over effect of
assignment to state in which retired pay is divisible between spouses); McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210, 234 (1981) (military personnel, unlike civilian employees, are not free to choose
place of residence).
,,3 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 55 (statement of Lt. Gen. Andrew P. Iosue)
(service member contemplating divorce might not obey willingly assignment to community
property or equitable distribution state).
" See Garfield, supra note 1, at 528 n.169 (state statutes). Military servicemen's
statutes purport to create jurisdiction over military personnel on the basis of either
domicile or presence within a state by reason of military assignment. Id. at 527-58.
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time prior to the divorce proceedings."' In some cases, however, state
courts have been reluctant to construe special servicemen's statutes as
providing proper jurisdiction in the absence of a service member's
domicile with the state asserting jurisdiction.'16 The provisions of the
Act concerning jurisdiction to divide retired or retainer pay are consist-
ent with the results in cases that have found domicile of the service
member a prerequisite to valid jurisdiction."'
Arguably, Congress may have contemplated a relaxation of the
preference for domicile to effectuate the purpose of the Act to protect
the economic position of the former spouse."' The Act's grant of authority
to divide retired or retainer pay and the establishment of a mechanism
for direct payments to former spouses express a congressional intent to
provide some measure of relief to spouses of military service members."9
In light of the trend among the states in favor of dividing retired or re-
tainer pay"' and a congressional intent to provide a measure of financial
protection to former spouses,"' however, a relaxation of the strict
"' See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN § 60-1603(b) (1976) (60 days prior to filing of divorce peti-
tion); 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1272 (Supp. 1982-83) (six months prior to filing of divorce petition);
VA. CODE § 20-97 (Supp. 1982) (six months prior to separation and continued residence
within state until commencement of divorce action).
"' See Viernes v. District Court, 181 Colo. 284. , 509 P.2d 306, 310 (1973) (en
bane). In Viernes, the Supreme Court of Colorado found insignificant contact between the
state and the serviceman to support jurisdiction over his divorce. Id. at _ , 509 P.2d at
310. Although the serviceman had met the durational residence requirement of the Col-
orado statute, the court followed the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. North
Carolina and held that jurisdiction for divorce required domicile. Id., 509 P.2d at 310. See
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945; supra note 109 (Supreme Court's
preference for domicile as proper basis of divorce jurisdiction).
.. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(4) (Supp. 3 1982); supra text accompanying notes 106-07
(state may not assert jurisdiction by residence based on service member's assignment).
Since the establishment of domicile requires a physical presence within a state and an intent
to remain in the state, coerced presence within a state might tend to negate intent to re-
main. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 18 (1961) (movement to new
residence with intent to remain establishes domicile); Military Domicile, supra note 108, at
175-76 (military assignment may raise presumption against finding domicile of serviceman
in place of assignment); supra note 110 (domicile requires establishment of new home and in-
tention to remain). Some courts have held, however, that the compulsion inherent in
military assignment does not preclude necessarily a finding that a service member has
established domicile at his place of assignment. Se_ Ferrara v. Ibach, 285 F. Supp. 1017,
1020 (D.S.C. 1968) (facts and circumstances clearly revealed serviceman's intention to
change domicile to place of assignment); cf. Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1126 (6th Cir.
1973) (rejecting per se rule against prisoner's domicile at place of imprisonment).
"18 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 9 (Congress saw no need to impose additional
restrictions on jurisdiction or prescribe certain types of contacts with state by service
member).
. Id. at 5 (purpose of Act is to restore law to what it was before McCarty decision).
'" See supra notes 39-42 (movement in favor of finding that retired pay is divisible be-
tween spouses).
' See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 5 (Act returns treatment of retired or re-
tainer pay to states).
[Vol. 40:271
MILITARY RETIRED PAY
preference for domicile would not be likely to encourage abuses of
jurisdiction by former spouses.1" Providing jurisdiction to divide retired
or retainer pay on the basis of either a service member's domicile or his
residence under a servicemen's statute would not prejudice the rights of
service members to other marital property." A service member would
remain free to contest the validity of any divorce decree that directs the
payment of retired or retainer pay to a former spouse.2 4 Nevertheless,
to receive the benefits of the Act the former spouse must demonstrate
to the court that the service member has established some connection
with the court's territorial jurisdiction other than the member's military
assignment to the state.'2
" See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548-49
(1948). In Sosna, the Supreme Court upheld a one-year residence requirement for obtaining
a divorce. 419 U.S. at 409-10. The Court reasoned that the state's interest in assuring
recognition of its divorce decrees by other states justified the one-year requirement. Id. at
407. In Estin, the Court formulated the concept of a 'divisible divorce.' 334 U.S. at 548-49.
Divisible divorce allows a spouse to sue and to receive an ex parte decree of divorce from a
service member. Id. A court must have personal jurisdiction, however, to adjudicate the
property rights of the service member, including retired or retainer pay. Id.; see 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 1408(c)(4) (Supp. 3 1982) (bases of jurisdiction over service member provided in Act).
12 See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418-19 (1957) (personal jurisdiction
necessary to decide property issues); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1948) (same); Gar-
field, supra note 1, at 510-12 (personal jurisdiction to decide property issues protects absent
spouse affected by ex parte divorce decree). Section 1408(g) of the Act requires a person
who has received service of a court order directing payment of retired or retainer pay to
notify the service member whom the court order affects. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(g) (Supp. 3
1982). A similar notification requirement applies to payments of Civil Service and Foreign
Service retirement benefits. See 5 C.F.R. § 831.1707 (1982) (Civil Service); 22 C.F.R. § 19.6-6
(1982) (Foreign Service). Both the Civil Service and Foreign Service regulations allow the
recipient of pension benefits 30 days in which to contest the validity of any court order
before the government makes payments of the benefits to a former spouse. 5 C.F.R. §
831.1707(3) (1982); 22 C.F.R. § 19.6-6(2) (1982); see also supra note 103 (protection of military
service members involved in civil litigation).
1u Cf. Lowell v. McDavid, 532 F. Supp. 172, 174 (E.D. Va. 1980); Cunningham v. Depart-
ment of the Navy, 455 F. Supp. 1370, 1372-73 (D. Conn. 1978). In Lowell and Cunningham
the courts held that a serviceman could not attack collaterally garnishment orders. Lowell,
532 F. Supp. at 174; Cunningham, 455 F. Supp. at 1373. In both cases, the courts found that
the waiver of federal government immunity from suit in the statute providing for garnish-
ment did not extend to suits by military service members. Lowell, 532 F. Supp. at 174; Cun-
ningham, 455 F. Supp. at 1373. Accord Hobbs v. United States Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, 485 F. Supp. 456, 458-59 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (government official immune from suit
challenging payment of Civil Service pension to former wife in accordance with statute).
The Act provides that no government employee will be liable for payments of retired or re-
tainer pay pursuant to a court order that is regular on its face. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(f)(1)
(Supp. 3 1982); supra text accompanying notes 95-104 (direct payment of retired or retainer
pay after service of court orders regular on their face). The Act, however, does contemplate
challenges of validity of court orders in state courts. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at
23 (service member may take legal action after receiving notice of intended payment to
former spouse).
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 8-9. Congress did not specify which contacts
would support proper jurisdiction for the purpose of the Act. Id. at 9. Relying on existing
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In addition to the jurisdictional requirements of the Act, the finality
of a former spouse's divorce decree may prevent the former spouse from
securing the benefits of Act. ' To avoid legislative reversal of the Mc-
Carty decision, 2 ' Congress limited the authority provided in section
1408(c)(1) to divide retired or retainer pay to amounts payable to a ser-
vice membhr for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, the date the
Supreme Court announced the McCarty decision.'" A former spouse
whose divorce decree became final before June 26, 1981 may not seek to
modify the terms of the decree to participate in the direct payment
mechanism. 2 9 The finality of a former spouse's divorce decree, therefore,
is an important factor in determining whether the former spouse may
receive direct payments of retired or retainer pay.20 Section 1408(a)(3)
defines final decree for the purposes of the Act.'3' A final decree is a
decree that a former spouse may not appeal or from which the former
spouse has not appealed within the time allowed by laws applicable to
appeals."' A final decree also may be a decree that the former spouse
has appealed and for which the former spouse has received a final decis-
ion under applicable laws.'
3 3
Some former spouses in pre-McCarty cases whose divorce decrees
did not address whether retired or retainer pay is divisible marital prop-
erty may be eligible for direct payments under section 1408(d)(1) of the
Act."14 Omission of retired or retainer pay as an issue in the cases may
have occurred in several ways. The service member and his former
spouse may have neglected to contest the issue."5 The parties may have
protections against abuse of jurisdiction, Congress left the adjudication of jurisdictional
disputes to state courts on a case-by-case basis. Id.
1 1 See infra text accompanying notes 128-33 (limitations of Act with respect to finality
of divorce decrees).
'z See supra note 82 (disfavor of legislative reversal of court judgments).
10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(1) (Supp. 3 1982); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
12 See Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, § 1006(b), PuB. L. No.
97-252, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 730, 737. A service secretary must pay
retired or retainer pay directly to a former spouse from amounts payable to a service
member after the Act's effective date, February 1, 1983. See id. § 1006(a), (b). The payment
provision applies without regard to the date of the court order served on the secretary by a
former spouse. Id. § 1006(b). A former spouse with a pre-McCarty final divorce decree that
prohibited division of retired or retainer pay between a service member and his former
spouse, however, may not use the Act's direct payment mechanism. Id.
"' See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 13-14 (to receive benefit of Act former spouse
must submit final court order).
131 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(a)(3) (Supp. 3 1982).
132 Id.
133 Id.
'" See id. § 1408(a)(2}(C). The Act requires, for the purpose of the direct payment
mechanism, a final decree of divorce that specifically orders payment of an amount or
percentage of retired or retainer pay to a former spouse. Id.; infra text accompanying notes
135-36 (circumstances under which former spouse in pre-McCarty case may obtain direct
payments of retired or retainer pay).
'3 See In re Miller, 117 Cal. App. 3d 366, 370-71, 172 Cal. Rptr. 745, 747-48 (Ct. App.
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requested the trial court to reserve jurisdiction over retired or retainer
pay pending the Supreme Court's disposition of the McCarty case. '
Since the Act's definition of court order requires a divorce decree that
specifically directs payment of retired or retainer pay to a former
spouse... and since the Act allows for modifications of previously issued
divorce decrees,' 8 a former spouse may litigate the issue of retired or re-
tainer pay to take advantage of the Act's direct payment mechanism.'
Some former spouses may obtain court orders that comply with the
Act's requirements governing the direct payment mechanism, only to
discover that the service member no longer is eligible to receive retired
or retainer pay." A service member may lose eligibility for retired or
retainer pay other than through forfeitures or by engaging in prohibited
activities."' Retired service members are eligible to receive disability
pensions administered by the Veterans Administration (VA).' To
receive a VA pension, a disabled service member must waive the right
to receive an amount of retired or retainer pay equal to the amount of
1981) (no reference to military retired pay in pleadings, stipulation, interlocutory or final
judgments of separation); cf. Giovannoni v. Giovannoni, 122 Cal. App. 3d 666, 671-72, 176
Cal. Rptr. 154, 157 (Ct. App. 1981) (omitted from property settlement on basis of attorney's
statement that husband's pension had no value).
" See Wintriss v. Superior Court, - Cal. App. 3d - 182 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698
(Ct. App. 1982) (court reserved jurisdiction to change characterization of retired pay as com-
munity property pending decision in McCarty cases).
"3 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 3 1982).
' Id. § 1408(a)(2). Section 1408(a)(2) allows modifications of previously issued decrees.
Id. The Act, however, prohibits modifications of pre-McCarty final decrees. See supra note
129 (former spouse with decree prohibiting division of retired or retainer pay may not use
direct payment mechanism).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 131-33 (provisions of Act regarding finality of
divorce decrees). The Act does not prevent a former spouse whose divorce decree did not
address the issue of retired or retainer pay from subsequently contesting the issue. See
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, § 1006(b), Pub. L. No. 97-252, 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (96 Stat.) 730, 737. Further, a former spouse who received a
divorce decree after the McCarty decision may seek to modify her divorce decree to take
advantage of the Act. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 16 (former spouse may modify
decree to take advantage of Act's direct payment provision).
"' See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(a)(4) (Supp. 3 1982). A former spouse does not receive any
rights to retired or retainer pay greater than the entitlement of the service member. See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 16; text accompanying notes 50-54 (loss of retired or re-
tainer pay entitlement). In addition, state courts may not order a service member to retire
to initiate the direct payment mechanism of the Act. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(3) (Supp. 3 1982).
" See infra text accompanying notes 142-53 (defeating former spouse's interest by
election to receive VA disability pension). A retired service member recalled to active duty
receives active duty pay. See 37 U.S.C. § 903 (1976). Since the Act's direct payment
mechanism relates to retired or retainer pay, a former spouse will not receive direct
payments during the service member's recall. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 15-16
(suspension of direct payments during service member's recall to active duty).
See 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1976) (pension for war-related disability); id. § 331 (pension for
disability not related to war). VA pensions are exempt from attachment and taxation. Id. §
3101(a)(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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VA disability pension.' In cases decided before the Act, most courts
held that VA disability pensions are not subject to division between a
disabled service member and a former spous'e. 1' Thus,.a retired service
member could defeat a former spouse's interest in retired or retainer
pay by electing to receive a VA disability pension."-' Moreover, the effec-
tive date of the waiver was the date on which the service member
became eligible to receive a VA disability pension and not the date on
which the service member actually waived retired or retainer pay."6
The Act does not protect a former spouse from the service member's
election to receive a VA disability pension in lieu of retired or retainer
pay. 7 The authority granted to state courts to divide retired or retainer
pay and the operation of the Act's direct payment mechanism depend
upon the Act's definition of disposable monthly retired or retainer pay."8
In addition to other amounts deducted from retired or retainer pay to ar-
rive at disposable retired or retainer pay,' section 1408(a)(4)(B) excludes
,43 38 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976). A service member must notify the service department
through which he receives retired or retainer pay that he waives an amount of retired or re-
tainer pay. Id. The service department then must notify the VA of the service member's
waiver, the amount waived, and the effective date of the subsequent reduction of retired or
retainer pay. Id.
' See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 96 N.M. 497 __, 632 P.2d 732, 733 (1981) (once service
member elects to receive VA pension, payments may not be considered community property);
Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 194-96 (Tex. 1981) (federal law prohibits characterization of
VA pension as community property). But see In re Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 787, 582 P.2d 96,
100-01, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (1978) (en banc) (only amount of VA disability pension in excess of
amount waived is service member's separate property).
"' See Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 194-96 (Tex. 1981). In Burson, a service
member had retired and begun to receive disability retirement pay. Id. at 193. The court
held the service member in contempt for failing to comply with a divorce decree that awarded a
share of the disability retirement pay to his former spouse. Id. The service member subse-
quently elected to receive a VA disability pension. Id. The Texas Supreme Court held that
under federal law the service member was entitled to make the election unhampered by the
state's community property law. Id.; cf. In re Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 786, 582 P.2d 96,
100-01, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13-14 (1978) (en banc). In Stenquist, the California Supreme Court
held that under the state's community property law the service member could not defeat his
wife's community property interest in retired pay by invoking a condition wholly within the
member's control. Id. 582 P.2d at 100-01, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 13-14. In addition, the Stenquist
court concluded that the primary purpose of a VA disability pension is retirement support
and not compensation for a service member's loss of earning power from his disability. Id. at
787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
"' See 58 OP. COMP. GEN. 622 (1979) (effective date of retired pay waiver is earliest date
service member is eligible for VA disability benefits); cf. Strickland v. Commissioner, 540
F.2d 1196, 1199 (4th Cir. 1976) (effective date of waiver is date service member applies for VA
disability benefits).
... See supra text accompanying notes 143-45 (service member's election to receive VA
pension defeating former spouse's interest in retired or retainer pay); infra text accompany-
ing notes 149-54 (direct payment provision of Act excludes VA disability pension benefits).
148 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(a)(4) (Supp. 3 1982) (Act's definition of disposable retired or re-
tainer pay).
"' See id. Section 1408(a)(4) defines disposable monthly retired or retainer pay as the
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the amount of retired or retainer pay that the service member waives
when he elects a VA disability pension.' 50 Thus, any former spouse who
shares in a service member's retired or retainer pay under the terms of
a court order still faces a possibility that the service member may defeat
the former spouse's interest by an election to receive a VA disability
pension. 5' A former spouse faces an additional problem with regard to
VA disability pensions. Before the Act, some courts construed strictly
with respect to VA disability pensions a provision in federal law that
allows a former spouse to garnish military compensation for alimony or
child support obligations." Therefore, under .both the Act and the case
law preceding the Act a former spouse is unlikely to reach the service
member's VA disability pension by any process.'
The McCarty Court stated that the process available to garnish
retired or retainer pay for alimony or child support obligations could
mitigate to some extent the plight of a former spouse.'" Section 459 of
the Social Security Amendments of 1974"1 permits a former spouse to
garnish retired or retainer pay for support obligations. 6 ' Garnishment
process, however, is not available to secure payment pursuant to a divis-
ion of property between a service member and a former spouse."7 The
total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a service member-is entitled less certain
deductions. Id. § 1408(a)(4)(A)-(F) (deduction for fines and forfeitures upon court martial;
amounts owed to United States; taxes properly withheld; life insurance premiums; amounts
used to fund survivors' annuities).
Id. § 1408(a)(4)(B).
1" See supra note 145 (election of VA disability pension defeats interest of former
spouse in retired or retainer pay).
... See 42 U.S.C. §§ 659(a), 662(c)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 659 waives the iin-
munity of the federal government against suits to enforce alimony or child support obliga-
tions. Id. § 659(a). Section 662 limits the kinds of federal benefits subject to garnishment. Id. §
662(f). Courts have reached different conclusions on the meaning of a provision in section
662(f) that limits'garnishment to federal benefits that rppresent remuneration for employ-
ment. See United States v. Murray, 158 Ga. App. 781, 784-86, 282 S.E.2d 372, 375-76 (1981)
(only amount of VA disability pension in excess of retired pay waived is free from garnish-
ment); cf. Douglas v. Donovan, 534 F. Supp. 191, 195 (D.D.C. 1982) (plain language of federal
garnishment statute excludes Civil Service disability benefits from legal process). Compare
Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 471,375 A.2d 659, 663 (1977) (VA disability benefits subject to
garnishment) with Elmwood v. Elmwood, 295 N.C. 168, 179, 244 S.E.2d 668, 675 (1978) (VA
disability benefits exempt from garnishment).
" See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 3 1982) (provision of Act specifically exempting
VA disability pension benefits from amounts subject to direct payment to former spouse).
5 453 U.S. at 235.
15 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
" Id.; see S. Rep. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. __ , reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG & AD NEws 8133, 8157 (section 659 provides garnishment of all federal compensation
based on employment). See also 42 U.S.C. § 662(b) (Supp. V 1981). Section 662(b) defines child
support as an obligation provided in a court order to make periodic payments for the support
and maintenance of a child. Id. Section 662(c) defines alimony as a court ordered obligation to
furnish funds periodically for the support and maintenance to a spouse or former spouse. Id. §
662(c).
1" 42 U.S.C. § 662(c) (Supp. V 1981); see Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230, 1231 (5th Cir.
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Act provides a limited exception to the restriction of garnishment pro-
cess to support obligations based on need.158 Section 1408(d)(5) permits
direct payments by a service secretary of other marital property
payable to a former spouse under a court order."9 The service
secretaries will make direct payments of other marital property from
the service member's disposable retired or retainer pay.60 To receive
the payments of other marital property, a former spouse must serve the
appropriate service secretary with a court order of garnishment."' The
total amount that the service secretaries may pay to a former spouse, in-
cluding amounts paid under a garnishment order dealing with other
marital property, cannot exceed fifty percent of a service member's
disposable monthly retired or retainer pay.6 2 The Act also permits
former spouses to garnish retired or retainer pay for alimony or child
support obligations under other provisions of federal law." Section
1408(e)(4)(B) limits the total amount of a service member's retired or re-
tainer pay subject to direct payment under the Act or other legal pro-
cess to sixty-five percent of disposable monthly retired or retainer
pay.1u
The opportunity of a former spouse to reach as much as sixty-five
percent of a service member's retired or retainer pay is a significant im-
provement over the former spouse's position immediately following the
Supreme Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty."' By enacting the
1977) (per curiam) (community property settlement not enforceable by § 659 garnishment
order); Kelley v. Kelley, 425 F. Supp. 181, 183 (W.D. La. 1977) (same).
" See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d)(5) (Supp. 3 1982) (garnishment of property other than
retired or retainer pay).
159 Id.
" See supra note 149 (definition of disposable monthly retired or retainer pay).
... See supra text accompanying notes 98-104 (requirements for effective service of
court orders on secretary of military service or designated agent).
.62 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(e)(1) (Supp. 3 1982).
"e Id. § 1408(e)(4)(A); see supra text accompanying notes 154-57 (garnishment of retired
or retainer pay under 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The service secretaries will
honor court orders for direct payment of retired or retainer pay pursuant to § 1408(d)(1) and
court orders of garnishment for alimony or child support obligations under 42 U.S.C § 659
on a first-come, first-served basis. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(e)(4)(A) (Supp. 3 1982).
'" See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(e)(4)(B) (Supp. 3 1982). Congress contemplated that the direct
payment mechanism established in the Act and the regular process for garnishment under
42 U.S.C. § 659 would operate in tandem. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 20-21. The
65% limit on the total amount of retired or retainer pay subject to process under federal
law is based on a provision in the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Id. at 21; see 15 U.S.C. §
1673(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (setting limitation on earnings subject to garnishment).
State law limits on the amount of disposable monthly retired or retainer pay subject to legal
process that are more favorable to the service member will prevail over the 65% limit. See
Evans v. Evans, 429 F. Supp. 580, 582 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (Consumer Credit Protection Act
does not pre-empt more restrictive state limit on amount subject to garnishment).
' 453 U.S. 210 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 62-68 (McCarty decision, by
prohibiting division of retired or retainer pay as marital property, limited former spouses to
need-based means of support).
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Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Congress has
returned the treatment of retired or retainer pay to the states, which
under the federal system are the source of law concerning marriage,
divorce, and the disposition of marital property.'" State laws dealing
with disposition of property between spouses have undergone con-
siderable change in recent decades.167 A significant feature of state law
developments is the trend toward a more equitable sharing of property
between spouses." Retirement benefits have assumed an important
place in the financial planning of married couples."9 State courts have
been inclined to find that retirement benefits payable to persons in the
private sector of the economy and to retired members of the military
services represent a form of property acquired through the efforts of
both partners to a marriage.7
The Act recognizes that the spouses of military service members
contribute to the overall effectiveness of the Nation's military forces.'
A service member's spouse plays a significant role in the preservation of
family cohesion amid the rigors of military life and in the advancement
of a service member's career. 2 Upon divorce from a service member, a
former spouse may discover that the couple has acquired few assets ex-
cept the retirement benefits the member receives or will receive for his
military service.'73 In addition, few former spouses have the opportunity
to acquire separate assets or retirement benefits.174
The Act does not guarantee financial support for the former spouse
of a service member. The Act, however, does remove the principal
obstacle to sharing in a service member's retirement benefits, pre-
'" See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 16 (state again may consider retired or re-
tainer pay as divisible between spouses on basis of law at time of McCarty decision); supra
text accompanying notes 1 & 2 (states' powers over marriage and divorce).
18 See Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1977) (true economic equality between sexes is emerging in state
marital property laws); Development of Sharing Principles, supra note 7, at 1308-13 (aban-
donment of historical concepts of separate property for economic fairness); supra text ac-
companying notes 38-42 (trend in state law to find rights of former spouse to share in
military service member's retired or retainer pay).
'" See supra notes 4 & 5 (reform of state laws dealing with marriage, divorce, and
economic relationships between spouses).
189 See Prager, supra note 167, at 7-10 (employment and financial circumstances forcing
married couples to consider separately acquired assets as available for needs of both hus-
band and wife).
" See supra text accompanying notes 41 & 42 (state courts considering retired or re-
tainer pay as similar to private pensions).
171 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 6 (Act acknowledges former spouse's unique
status and contribution to military service member's career and to national defense).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See Brief for Amicus Curiae at 47-55, McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (few
former spouses of military service members have long-term employment necessary to earn
separate pension rights).
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emption of state marital property laws that the Supreme Court found in
McCarty."' The Act enhances enforcement of divorce decrees by
establishing a payment mechanism by which a former spouse may
receive directly from the federal government any retired or retainer pay
awarded under state law.176 The Act, however, contains several limita-
tions on who may receive direct payments. 1 7 The Act does not help
former spouses who litigated the issue of retired or retainer pay to final
unsuccessful conclusions prior to the McCarty case."" If a divorce decree
was not final before McCarty, a former spouse may be able to seek a
favorable decision and come within the Act's protection."9 In addition, a
former spouse who seeks direct payment of retired or retainer pay must
satisfy a ten year length-of-marriage requirement 80 and must
demonstrate that the trial court had proper jurisdiction over the service
member.81 Finally, the Act preserves the option of a disabled service
member to receive a Veterans Administration pension in lieu of retired
or retainer pay. 82 Election of a VA pension will continue to defeat a
former spouse's court-awarded share of retired or retainer pay.8 3 The
former spouse of a military service member must determine whether
she is eligible for the Act's protection and carefully follow the re-
quirements of the Act to receive her share of the service member's
military retirement benefits.
PETER MALLORY
175 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 16 (section 1408(a)(1) of Act removes Supreme
Court's finding of pre-emption in McCarty case).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 95-105 (direct payment provisions of Act).
177 See supra text accompanying note 96 (limitation of direct payments of retired or re-
tainer pay to former spouses married at least 10 years to service member); supra text ac-
companying notes 127-29 (former spouse who received divorce decree denying share of
retired or retainer pay before McCarty case may not modify decree).
178 See supra text accompanying notes 131-33 (provisions of Act dealing with finality of
divorce decrees).
... See SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 16-18 (Act should not be used to reopen pre-
McCarty judgments that did not divide retired or retainer pay).
.. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d)(2) (Supp. 3 1982).
... See supra text accompanying notes 105-25 (provisions of Act dealing with jurisdic-
tion over military service members).
" See supra text accompanying notes 147-53 (effect of service member's election to
receive VA disability pension in lieu of retired or retainer pay).
183 Id.
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